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Why the Auditing Standards on Evaluating 
Internal Control Needed to be Replaced 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Coopers & Lybrand 
In February 1988, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA 
approved the issuance of nine Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The 
profession developed these statements to narrow what has been referred to as 
the "expectations gap," the gap between what the public and financial 
statement users believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors believe 
they are responsible for. Among the new standards, there is one that 
dramatically changes the auditor's responsibility for considering internal control 
in a financial statement audit. Effective for audits of financial statements 
beginning on or after January 1, 1990, SAS No. 55, Consideration of the 
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, replaces Section 
320, The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, of SAS No. 1. 
This new standard is by far the most complex and controversial, at least 
among academic circles, of the new auditing standards adopted by the 
profession. This paper discusses the author's perspective on why the new 
standard was issued. 
Should Section 320 Have Been Revised Rather Than Replaced? 
The ASB concluded that the minimum study and evaluation of internal 
control required by Section 320 was insufficient for audit planning. Effective 
audit planning requires the auditor to identify the types of material misstate-
ments that could occur in the financial statements and to assess the risk that 
such misstatements will occur. Because an entity's internal control significantly 
affects the possibility of misstatements in the financial statements, the ASB 
concluded that the auditor needed a better understanding of internal control 
when planning an audit. 
This is a different notion from that encompassed by the minimum study and 
evaluation required by Section 320, which stated that the purpose of the review 
of the system was to obtain sufficient knowledge and understanding about the 
accounting system and the internal accounting control system "(a) to make a 
determination of whether there are internal accounting control procedures that 
may provide a basis for reliance thereon in determining the nature, extent, and 
timing of substantive tests; or (b) to aid the auditor in designing substantive 
tests in the absence of such reliance.'' While Section 320 required the auditor 
to have a general knowledge about the control environment and flow of 
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transactions through the accounting system, it did not require any knowledge 
of control procedures unless the auditor planned to rely on them. 
Some may argue that Section 320 (particularly the limited knowledge about 
internal controls required for audit planning purposes) should have been 
amended rather than completely replaced. However, the basic fabric of Section 
320 was showing stress cracks, and there were compelling reasons for the 
Board's conclusion that so much of it had to go, and so many new concepts and 
principles had to be added, that it was far more appropriate to completely 
rewrite the standard than to attempt to patch it. Section 320 had evolved on a 
piecemeal basis over the past 36 years. It was a combination of three 
Statements on Auditing Procedure issued between 1949 and 1972 and was later 
amended by eight Statements on Auditing Standards. Several other SASs 
introduced or altered auditing concepts that should have been incorporated into 
Section 320, but were not. 
This combination of factors created a hodge-podge of professional require-
ments pertaining to the study and evaluation of internal control, with the result 
that many practitioners, from both small and large firms, were detouring 
around the standard in conducting audits. This was evidenced by the growing 
number of practitioners who preprinted memorandums for insertion into 
working paper binders on all of their audits that blatantly stated, in one fashion 
or another, that they "were not relying on internal controls," thereby 
disavowing any responsibility to understand the client's internal control 
procedures. 
Such statements were too often inconsistent with the auditor's substantive 
audit programs and other working papers that acknowledged the presence of 
effectively operating internal controls that affected either the nature or extent 
of specific substantive tests. For example, audit programs and working papers 
often reflected the presence of a well planned and controlled physical inventory, 
which the auditor tested for physical inventory quantities; the presence of cash 
reconciliations performed by "independent" employees, which were utilized 
by the auditor to restrict substantive tests of cash; and the existence of pre-
numbered shipping documents and customer invoices, which were matched 
and accounted for by the client to ensure the completeness of revenue and 
which the auditor often considered when deciding to restrict substantive tests 
to analytical procedures and tests of revenue transactions in the post-balance 
sheet period. 
There are probably many reasons why practitioners interpreted and applied 
Section 320 in the manner described above. This inconsistency in audit planning 
and performance avoided "relying on controls" and incurring the cost of 
applying compliance tests to specific control procedures. Compliance testing, 
to most practitioners, means re-performing a specific control procedure using 
the principles of sampling explained in SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA, 
1981]. This notion was exacerbated by the risk model in SAS No. 47, Audit 
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit [AICPA, 1983], which directs the 
auditor's assessment of control risk to the effectiveness of internal accounting 
control procedures related to an account balance or class of transactions—not to 
the effectiveness of the accounting system or the control environment, which 
most practitioners believe do reduce control risk in most entities. And finally, if 
the practitioner compliance tests one or more specific control procedures, 
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exactly how did he or she rely on them? How were substantive tests restricted 
in either nature or extent? These problems and questions were far easier for 
the practitioner to avoid by inserting a memorandum in the working papers that 
avoided the whole morass. 
The ASB recognized these problems associated with Section 320 and 
addressed them squarely when drafting SAS No. 55. By requiring auditors to 
take a different and broader view of internal controls—from the perspective of 
control risks—SAS No. 55 will change dramatically the way audits are planned 
and performed. The new standard will require the auditor to (a) assess control 
risk associated with the control environment, which research has demonstrated 
to be a principal source of audit risk; (b) broaden his or her perspective to 
include not only the control environment but also the accounting system and 
specific control procedures; and (c) consider control risk more discriminately, 
at the assertion level rather than at the class of transactions and account 
balance level, and along a continuum ranging from the maximum to the 
minimum. 
Importance of the Control Environment 
The key elements in the ASB's response to the "expectations gap" are (i) 
to increase the auditor's responsibilities in performing an audit of financial 
statements, (ii) to require audits to be planned and performed to provide 
reasonable assurance that material financial statement fraud and error will be 
detected and, most important, (iii) to provide guidance for meeting those 
increased responsibilities. To do this, the ASB needed to understand the types 
of irresponsible, unreliable financial reporting that led to the concerns ex-
pressed by Congress, the press, and the organizations that sponsored the 
Treadway Commission. 
Research conducted at Coopers & Lybrand led to the same conclusions as 
the Treadway research on fraud: the basic, underlying source of fraudulent 
financial reporting is found at the very top of the organization—what the 
Treadway report calls the tone at the top—not in erroneous or fictitious 
transaction data used to prepare the financial statements. In other words, the 
problem is not with specific internal control procedures; rather, it is related to 
the attitude, awareness, and actions of management pertaining to financial 
reporting—what auditors call the control environment—and this emphasizes 
the need to consider the risks associated with that environment when 
performing an audit. 
That same research also told us that almost all the financial frauds that 
occurred involved improper revenue recognition methods, the overvaluation of 
assets, or incomplete information in financial statements. In each instance, the 
fraudulent behavior was motivated not by a plan to embezzle corporate assets, 
but rather by the desire to mislead financial statement users for one or more of 
a variety of reasons. Moreover, the research showed that the major frauds 
were not perpetrated by manipulating data as the transactions passed through 
the accounting system. In fact, the perpetrators almost always used complete, 
accurate financial data in creating the misstatements. 
For example, accounting estimates, such as loan loss reserves, are based 
on subjective factors, and controls over them are often more difficult to 
establish than controls over factual information. As a result, there is greater 
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potential for bias by top management. Corporate watch-dogs, top management 
and directors, are less concerned these days with the number-crunching 
aspects of an audit or with the accuracy of the accounting for transactions, and 
are more concerned with management's judgments, estimates, and valuation 
decisions. 
Thus, audit risk is not reduced by chasing financial transactions endlessly 
through the client's accounting systems in the mostly irrelevant, and certainly 
boring, quest to establish their accuracy and the absence of "transaction 
error.'' Modern computer systems have a low risk of random error (systematic 
error is a greater risk, but it is generally assessed and tested by means other 
than re-performing controls at the transaction level). Furthermore, in the 
current computer environment, today's transactions are summarized tomor-
row to assist in managing the business, which in many environments further 
mitigates the risk of systematic error. In most environments, if the financial 
data are corrupted, employees, management, and third parties are generally 
the first to know. The auditor arrives long after the need to know arises and 
corrective action is to be taken. 
While the auditor still needs to assess the risk of "transaction error'' and to 
take appropriate steps where it is other than low, he or she also needs to focus 
on control risk from a broader perspective—the control environment. Specifi-
cally, the new standard requires the auditor to obtain the following information 
about the client: 
(a) Its management philosophy and operating style, 
(b) Its organizational structure, 
(c) Whether it has an effective audit committee, 
(d) The methods it uses to communicate authority and responsibility, 
(e) The management control methods it uses, 
(f) Whether it has an internal audit function, 
(g) Its personnel policies and procedures, 
(h) External influences on its operations, and 
(i) Regulatory rules under which it operates. 
Many critics have suggested that the control environment is illusive and 
that any assessment of it would be subjective and should not be used as a basis 
to restrict substantive tests. They argue that Section 320, in its abbreviated 
discussion of the control environment, stated that the auditor's understanding 
of it should provide general knowledge to be considered in deciding whether to 
test specific control procedures and not in restricting substantive tests. 
Further, they note that specific policies and procedures in the control 
environment cannot be compliance tested by re-performing them to obtain an 
understanding of management's and the board's overall attitude, awareness, 
and actions. 
Undeniably, the auditor's assessment of the control environment involves 
judgments based on his or her observation of actions and documents. However, 
this does not mean that the auditor obtains the required understanding of the 
control environment by casual conversations with enterprise management. 
Rather, that understanding involves making judgments based on observing and 
inspecting evidence of the implementation of policies and procedures that 
demonstrate the actions taken by management related to the financial reporting 
process. 
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The practice aid developed by Coopers & Lybrand for understanding and 
assessing the control environment requires the auditor to gather, consider, and 
reach conclusions on about 60 separate factors for even the smallest clients. I 
believe that the assessment of this type of information in conducting an audit 
will aid in focusing the auditor's attention on risks that are unusually high, as 
well as in identifying opportunities for more efficient audit procedures. 
The Internal Control Structure—A Broader Concept 
SAS No. 55 replaces the concept of internal control with a broader concept, 
the internal control structure, which includes the control environment. The 
internal control structure also includes the accounting system and specific 
control procedures. This broader concept acknowledges that policies and 
procedures established within each of the three elements can be relevant to 
audit planning, since they are an important source of information about the 
types and risk of potential misstatements in the financial statements. Each of 
the three elements of the control structure also provides information about the 
recording, processing, summarizing, and reporting of financial data useful for 
designing substantive tests. 
Section 320 also discussed each of the three elements, but provided limited 
guidance about the control environment and the accounting system, and 
excluded them from the concept of internal control. SAS No. 55, in addition to 
expanding the concept of internal control, provides more guidance about the 
interrelationship of these three elements of the control structure, particularly in 
the context of audit planning. The new standard requires the auditor to obtain 
knowledge about all three elements of the internal control structure to 
determine whether policies and procedures relating to each of the elements 
have been placed in operation. 
The accounting system was distinguished in Section 320 from the system of 
internal accounting control. This is a distinction without a difference in modern 
computer systems, where thousands of programmed procedures operate 
interactively to produce reliable financial data. Identifying which individual 
programmed procedures operate as controls is not so important as identifying 
whether the architecture of the accounting system, including the controls over 
it, enables the entity to record, process, and summarize reliable financial data. 
SAS No. 55 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient knowledge of the 
accounting system to understand: 
• The classes of transactions in the entity's operations that are 
significant to the financial statements; 
• How those transactions are initiated; 
• The accounting records, supporting documents, machine-readable 
information, and specific accounts in the financial statements involved 
in the processing and reporting of transactions; 
• The process of accounting from the initiation of a transaction to its 
inclusion in the financial statements, including how the computer is 
used to process data; and 
• The financial reporting process used to prepare the entity's financial 
statements, including significant accounting estimates and dis-
closures. 
When the auditor obtains an understanding of the accounting system and 
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the control environment, he or she is also likely to obtain knowledge about 
related individual control procedures. For example, when obtaining an under-
standing of the accounting system pertaining to inventory, the auditor usually 
will become aware that physical inventory quantities are reconciled to the 
accounting records. The auditor considers the knowledge about control 
procedures obtained from the understanding of the control environment and 
accounting system in determining the additional understanding of individual 
control procedures that is necessary to plan the audit. 
SAS No. 55, however, does not require the auditor to obtain an understand-
ing of individual control procedures related to all account balances, classes of 
transactions, or assertions embodied in the financial statements. The knowl-
edge that the auditor needs about each of the internal control elements for audit 
planning purposes is affected by his or her assessment of inherent risk, 
preliminary judgments about materiality, the complexity of the entity's opera-
tions and systems, and information about the entity obtained from prior audits 
that may be relevant to the assessment of control risk. The latter item is an 
important concept that SAS No. 55 recognizes and Section 320 did not. While 
this concept is new to the authoritative literature, it is already embedded in 
some firms' auditing manuals and, in practice, all auditors, consciously or not, 
take prior years' results into account in assessing control risk. 
Assessing Control Risk Along a Broad Continuum 
SAS No. 55 provides a framework for practitioners to improve their 
assessment of control risk in two respects. First, it establishes a requirement 
to assess control risk in relation to the financial statement assertions identified 
in SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter [AICPA, 1980]. This helps with the age-old 
linkage problem that has confronted auditors in the past because it fuses a bond 
among the internal control structure, assessing control risk, and obtaining 
evidential matter about financial statement assertions. 
Focusing the auditor's attention on control risk at the assertion level is 
particularly important in today's audit environment. Modern computer systems 
have dramatically increased the reliability of financial data on which manage-
ment makes valuation judgments, and presentation and disclosure decisions. 
The valuation and the presentation and disclosure assertions, which involve 
management judgment applied to financial data after they have been processed 
by the accounting system, often represent relatively high risks to the auditor. 
For example, after assessing control risk, the auditor may conclude that the 
completeness, mechanical accuracy, and existence of accounts receivable are 
low risks and may adjust the nature and extent of substantive tests accordingly 
for these audit objectives. However, the auditor may conclude that the control 
environment is not conducive to reducing control risk to a low level for the 
audit objectives relating to the valuation, and the presentation and disclosure 
assertions. 
Section 320 and SAS No. 55 remind us that the fundamental reasons for not 
permitting complete reliance on controls are the inherent limitations on the 
effectiveness of accounting control, namely, human error caused by misunder-
standing of instructions, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, distraction, or 
fatigue; collusion; management override of controls; and the ineffectiveness of 
controls in preventing wrong estimates and judgments that enter into the 
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financial statements. These are all valid points about the limitations on the 
effectiveness of controls. But these limitations may not be relevant to the 
conclusion that there is a low level of audit risk with respect to certain 
assertions regarding specific accounts, e.g., those assertions about rights and 
obligations, presentation and disclosure, and the measurement of accounting 
estimates. 
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that when audit risk is appropriately low as a 
result of the auditor's judgment about control risk together with inherent risk 
for a specific assertion or related audit objective, the auditor need not apply 
specific tests to an account balance or class of transactions to reduce detection 
risk for that specific assertion. One of the problems with Section 320 was that it 
was unclear on the issue of complete reliance on controls at the assertion level. 
The auditor was told not to place complete reliance on internal control to the 
exclusion of other auditing procedures with respect to particular account 
balances and classes of transactions, but no guidance was given about complete 
reliance at the individual assertion and audit objective levels. It is difficult to 
fathom the original intent of the framers of Section 320, simply because the 
notion of assertions and their relation to audit objectives was not explicitly 
addressed in the literature at that time. Many auditors, and obviously the ASB, 
now believe it is appropriate to permit complete reliance on controls at the 
individual assertion level. 
Moreover, substantive tests do not provide evidence about a single 
assertion only. For example, most analytical procedures provide evidence 
about all assertions relevant to an account balance. Confirmations of accounts 
receivable balances, while directed primarily at obtaining evidence about the 
existence assertion, also provide evidence about mechanical accuracy. 
The second way in which SAS No. 55 improves the auditor's assessment of 
control risk is that it replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely," 
approach with one that recognizes that the auditor's assessed level of control 
risk may vary from the maximum level to the minimum level for an assertion. 
The level assessed may be expressed in quantitative terms, such as percent-
ages, or qualitative terms such as maximum, moderate, or low. 
SAS No. 55 does not require the auditor to undertake procedures to assess 
control risk at below the maximum level for any assertion. However, when the 
auditor identifies potentially effective policies and procedures relevant to 
assertions, he or she may decide that it would be efficient to test the 
effectiveness of their design and operation. The tests used, which are referred 
to as tests of controls in SAS No. 55, include procedures such as inquiry, 
observation, inspection of documents, or reperformance of a policy or a 
procedure. The auditor then assesses the evidence obtained from these tests 
to make judgments about the level of control risk. 
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that in many audits the minimum required 
understanding of control structure policies and procedures will provide the 
auditor with knowledge about their effectiveness. This will often be so whether 
or not the auditor's procedures were designed to obtain evidence about the 
effectiveness of control structure policies and procedures as well as to obtain 
the required understanding. Thus, after obtaining the minimum understanding 
required by SAS No. 55, the auditor may conclude that control risk is below the 
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maximum level for some assertions because of evidence obtained about the 
effectiveness of specific policies or procedures. 
For example, in obtaining an understanding of the control environment, the 
auditor may examine evidence of management's cash forecasting and treasury 
operations. This may include inspecting management reports, as well as 
tracking actual cash receipts and collection of accounts receivable and compar-
ing them with forecasted amounts. This understanding may provide the auditor 
with knowledge about management's investigation of variances and other 
controls established over cash collections. In this scenario, even though the 
auditor's intention was to obtain an understanding about the treasury and cash 
forecasting systems used by management, the procedures may also provide 
evidence about the valuation of accounts receivable. 
Thus, the auditor is encouraged by SAS No. 55 to consider all evidence, 
whether obtained as part of understanding the control structure or from 
planned tests of controls, in reaching a judgment about the effectiveness of 
control policies and procedures. 
Conclusion 
At a recent meeting held to consider the implications of pervasive 
deficiencies noted in peer reviews conducted during the past year, eight 
matters were identified that indicated the possible need for guidance in auditing 
standards. Four of the eight matters related to performance deficiencies 
involving Section 320, and it can be argued that a fifth one is also associated 
with that section. This suggests that a disproportionately high percentage of 
audit performance problems relate to the evaluation of the client's internal 
control structure. While the implementation of SAS No. 55 has yet to stand the 
test of peer review, the standard establishes a framework that will significantly 
improve audit quality and the public perception of auditor performance. 
Chairman Dingell of the Congressional Oversight and Investigations Subcom-
mittee has often asked how auditors can examine financial statements and not 
know about their clients' internal controls. The answer "I didn't rely on 
internal controls" doesn't play very well. 
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